Physical Market Determinants of the Price of Crude Oil and the Market Premium by Chevillon, Guillaume & Rifflart, Christine
PHYSICAL MARKET DETERMINANTS
OF THE PRICE OF CRUDE OIL




















































centre de recherche / RESEARCH CENTER
AVENUE BERNARD HIRSCH
BP 50105 CERGY
95021 CERGY PONTOISE CEDEX
FRANCE
TéL. 33 (0)1 34 43 30 91
FAX 33 (0)1 34 43 30 01
research.center@essec.fr
essec business school.
établissements privés d’enseignement supérieur,
association loi 1901,
accréditéS aacsb international - the association 
TO ADVANCE COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS, 
accrédités EQUIS - the european quality improvement system,
affiliés à la chambre de commerce et d’industrie
de versailles val d’oise - yvelines.
Pour tous renseignements :
• Centre de Recherche/Research Center
Tél. 33 (0)1 34 43 30 91
research.center@essec.fr










June 2007Physical Market Determinants of the Price of Crude Oil and 
the Market Premium 
 
 
Guillaume Chevillon    Christine Rifflart 
ESSEC Business School,     Sciences-Po Center for 
Economic Research (OFCE) 
and    and 







We analyze the physical, i.e. non financial, determinants of the real price of 
crude oil by means of an equilibrium correction model over the last two decades. 
We find that two cointegrating relations affect the change in prices: one refers to 
OPEC’s cartel behavior attempting to control prices using its market power and 
quotas; the other to the coverage rate of expected future demand by OECD using 
inventory behaviours. We derive an equation for the change in oil prices which 
we use to assess the speculative elements of the early millennium price hike. We 
show that worries alien to the physical markets are the causes of the increase in 
oil prices and are able to quantify their impact. 
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Abstract
We analyze the physical, i.e. non ﬁnancial, determinants of the real price of crude oil by
means of an equilibrium correction model over the last two decades. We ﬁnd that two cointe-
grating relations aﬀect the change in prices: one refers to OPEC’s cartel behavior attempting
to control prices using its market power and quotas; the other to the coverage rate of expected
future demand by OECD using inventory behaviours. We derive an equation for the change in
oil prices which we use to assess the speculative elements of the early millenium price hike. We
show that worries alien to the physical markets are the causes of the increase in oil prices and
are able to quantify their impact.
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11 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of real oil prices in physical—i.e.
non ﬁnancial—markets and provide an equilibrium correction model (eqcm) thereof.
We then derive a corresponding market price which, when compared to the nominal
price, allows to derive the speculative—or non physical—premium.
Our choice of model is deliberate: we develop a model that relates the price of
a barrel of crude oil to the situation of physical markets and discard any specula-
tive elements. This allows us to quantify the latter as a diﬀerence between mar-
ket clearing—based on the historical data generating process—and nominal prices.
Other routes have been pursued by various authors who mostly analyzed risk premia
through option markets or who focused on modelling price volatility rather than its
level. Inter alia, Barros Lu´ ıs (2001) developed a risk aversion measure which he used
to assess the risk premium implicit in future contracts. Sadorsky (2002) considered
the opportunity to hold oil options when maximizing a portfolio’s return and used an
ARMAX-ARCH model to forecast that return. As for volatility estimation, Kuper
(2002) used a GARCH framework for estimating markets’ historical uncertainty via
price ranges.
Our decision to focus in this paper on linear models turns out quite rare in this
line of research. Most of the existent literature that uses linear models tends to
model the interaction between oil price and economic activity in oil importing or
exporting countries. For instance, Hamilton (2000) uses the output gap as a basis
for assessing the disruptive eﬀects of oil price hikes on agents’ behaviors. Amano &
van Norden (1998) exhibited a strong relation between real oil prices, exchange rates
2and terms of trade in major oil importing economies. Also important is our wish
to focus on determinants of market prices, not on economic elements presiding over
the physical supply side, namely the level of proven reserves, itself function of wells
where extraction is economically sound, which in turns depends on the price of oil.
The reader is referred e.g. to Farzin (2000) for such an approach.
Surprisingly, and testimony to the diﬃculty of the task at hand, few authors
have focused on crude oil price determination and forecasting. Philip K. Verleger
(1982) was probably the ﬁrst, but in his time, he could but simply focus on the link
between oﬃcial and spot (Rotterdam) prices. Among the recent papers, Tang &
Hammoudeh (2002) use a model whereby OPEC attempts to control prices with a
target range: they establish the presence of a non-linear relation between production
quotas, inventory levels (or stocks), supply and demand. Unfortunately, their model
brings no forecasting power. To our knowledge, Krichene (2002) and Yang et al.
(2002) are among the very few who applied an equilibrium correction model on oil
demand and supply. The analysis by Krichene focuses on the whole of the 20th
Century: the author derives price elasticities which can unfortunately be of no use
for our analysis restricted to the last two decades. As for Yang et al., they ﬁrst
estimated historic volatilities in the U.S. which, in turn, they add to eqcm models
for energy commodities such as coal, natural gas and crude oil. In the forecasting
literature, Ye et al (2005) notably derive an easy to implement short-term forecasting
model using seasonal eﬀects and inventories.
The plan of this paper is as follows. We ﬁrst present the main historic features
of crude oil markets in section 2. They, together with economic model for commodi-
3ties, preside over our choice of variables for our model of price determination; this
constitute the purpose of section 3. In section 4 we conduct a VAR and cointegra-
tion analysis. We assess, there, the validity of the weak exogeneity assumptions that
allows us to focus, in section 5, on a univariate model. We also derive a speculative
premium. Finally, section 6 concludes our analysis.
2 Global oil market features
Over the last two decades, crude oil prices have mainly been determined by market
mechanisms, yet this is in an imperfectly competitive market. As with any tradable
good, the price of oil follows the relative evolutions of supply and demand, decreasing
when the former abounds, increasing when the market situation tightens. However,
oil is no standard commodity: it is marred by political concerns in an oligopolistic
market dominated by a strong cartel, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC).
Worldwide demand still originates chieﬂy from OECD economies: according to
the data that the International Energy Agency (IEA) provides, they represent 60% of
world consumption. But since the mid-1990s, emerging economies, especially China
and India, have seen their consumptions surge. In 2004, China became the second
biggest consumer worldwide: behind the United States but before Japan. This rapid
growth seems the driving force behind the recent rise in the world’s energy demand,
with an increase in demand from developing Asian economies amounting to two third
of the total increase in energy consumption.
Short term ﬂuctuations in oil consumption—beyond seasonal activity—depend on
4the intensity of petroleum derivatives in the GDP and on the rate of growth of the
latter. Price evolutions matter very little here: short-run price elasticity of demand
for crude oil is near zero as there no substitutes to its use that are readily available.
This is not true for long-term ﬂuctuations though. Following the two oil shocks in the
1970s, industrialized economies have developed policies aimed at reducing dependence
on energy and diversiﬁcation away from oil. Yet, the decrease in prices which started
in 1985 softened the pressure and reduced the eﬀort. Nowadays, according to most
estimates—and the IEA in particular—the price elasticity of long term world demand
is around 0.5, provided that long term has a meaning for a non-renewable source of
energy which could deplete rapidly.
On the supply side, the oil sector is still oligopolistic: it is organized around a few
global private companies and the OPEC cartel. Although it controls only 40% of pro-
duction worldwide, OPEC has until recently played a crucial role on price formation
owing to its policy for regulating supply. Available reserves and spare productive ca-
pacities are chieﬂy located in the Middle Eastern OPEC countries. Originally created,
in 1960, to defend the interests of its members, the cartel has progressively adapted
its objectives: moving away from a policy of sustained high prices in the 1970s and
80s to a more consensual policy taking consumer countries into account. Hence, any
OPEC decision to increase or reduce production quotas may lower or raise the price
of crude oil.
Following a sharp reduction in market prices for crude oil in 1986, a new wave
of producers has progressively emerged, in particular Former Soviet Union countries
(FSU). This has let the price of a barrel of North Sea Brent stable at around US$
518-19 until 1997, a price then regarded as mostly fair by both OPEC and consumers.
Yet, following the Asian crisis and the fall in demand, oil prices collapsed to about
US$ 10 per barrel by the end of 1998. Hurt by this experience, OPEC decided to
increase transparency. It set up a target band of US$ 22 to 28 a barrel, based on the
OPEC basket of produced crude oil. In parallel, quota policy became very reactive
so as to follow the variations in global demand and prevent any excess supply or
lack thereof. A group of producer countries, amongst which Norway, Mexico and
Russia, started cooperating with OPEC in its attempt to control production. Since
2004, however, OPEC seems to have lost its capacity to control prices: their evolution
has been disconnected from relative supply and demand. This has taken place in a
period of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and global concerns for the long
term production capacities. Yet, oil remains a highly strategic commodity as it is the
main source of energy that sustains economic growth. OPEC owns today over 77%
of the world’s proven oil reserves.
What are the main features aﬀecting prices? OPEC’s behavior is crucial since it
represents about 55% of global oil exports. Since production in this industry is very
capital intensive, supply is rigid in the short-term: non OPEC producers tend to work
on full capacity and cannot adjust to take advantage of higher prices. Consumption
is aﬀected by seasonal factors, especially in the Northern Hemisphere where winter
are cold and summers hot. Hence, consumption of oil derivatives increases in the ﬁrst
and fourth quarters of each year. This is anticipated by building reﬁnery inventories
of crude oil and petroleum products in the third and fourth quarters. Speculations
and unusual weather conditions hence generate ample short term volatility.
63 Determinants of the price of crude oil
To derive an econometric model for the evolution of oil prices, we need to understand
what factors may intervene. Oil is a commodity which is traded in an imperfectly
competitive market, with few suppliers and many consumers. This oligopolistic struc-
ture implies that the price does not simply react to demand and supply as with many
exhaustible commodities. Indeed, according to Hotelling (1931), the price—net of
the constant marginal extraction cost—in a perfectly competitive market should be
in line with the interest rate, i.e. the discount rate that stabilizes the value of future
receipts so that the sacriﬁce of future generations who will not consume this resource
is taken into account. This simple law does not apply for oil since research originated
in the 1970s showed that the market is far from perfect (see inter alia Ulph and Folie
(1980)).
There exist many theoretical models for the determination of world supply, de-
mand and prices of oil, many of which originated from Nordhaus (1973) (see Choukri
(1979) for an early review of the pre-1979 shock theories). Following Griﬃn (1985),
we believe in a model consisting of a mix of cartel and competitive market practices
for the level of production. The latter should have a longer term impact than cartel
implications. Given that models of target revenue or property rights could be rejected
on empirical grounds by Griﬃn and that non-OPEC producers have increased their
signiﬁcance since the mid-1980s, we do not consider these types of models.
The econometric model we derive below takes the form of an equilibrium (or error)
correction model for the physical market price of crude oil. This model hence combines
both shorter and longer-run eﬀects. The rationale for their interaction stems from
7Hubbard (1986) who show how intertwined they must be.
3.1 What price?
In our attempt to relate the quarterly price of crude oil to the situation of the physical
market, we need to choose the relevant variables. First, what price to analyze? There
exist several references in world exchanges: North Sea Brent, West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) and Dubai. Each refers to an oil of high quality with a speciﬁc production or
trading location. The WTI and Dubai prices are chieﬂy traded in the United States
and Asia,whereas the North Sea Brent is often used as the world reference. In the
London-based ICE Futures exchange (formerly known as the International Petroleum
Exchange, or IPE), the Brent is used to specify the price of two third of crude oil
exchanged worldwide. In this paper, we therefore focus on the spot price of a barrel
of Brent, i.e. the price negotiated for immediate delivery on the physical market.
Although the diﬀerent prices do not ﬂuctuate perfectly in line over time, they more
or less follow one another.
The transform from nominal price to real price—the variable of interest for an
analysis of demand and supply—is made using the GDP deﬂator for the G7 group of
countries1. The resulting real price Pt is therefore related to the need for oil in the
production process of industrialized economies.
1Ideally, we would have used the deﬂator for all OECD economies, i.e. the main consumers of
oil. Owing to the lack of data for recent periods, we used the deﬂator for the G7. The latter closely
follows the OECD deﬂator for the available periods.
83.2 Supply and demand
Clearing of the physical market would normally lead to a price being ﬁxed so that
demand equals supply. Unfortunately, the market for crude oil is imperfect. Global
supply originates from the non-OPEC countries, which produce at full capacity at
all prices, and from OPEC, where production is regulated to maintain the price of a
basket of various types of crude oil within a target band. We use, here, the demand
for oil from the OECD (DOECD
t ), which has historically been the driving force behind
market evolutions, together with non OECD demand (Dnon OECD
t ) and inventories
(where at a given time the change in inventories—or stocks—is equal to the diﬀerence
between supply and demand) both in the OECD (SOECD
t ) and outside (Snon OECD
t ).
3.3 OPEC behavior
Until the mid-1990s, the OPEC cartel of producers had succeeded in controlling—
although somewhat loosely—world prices of crude oil via managing an important
fraction of world production. Although their control has weakened, we attempt to
analyze whether they still constitute a market force. In order to analyze their behav-
ior, we resort to two distinct variables: one is their oﬃcial production quota (Qt),
the other is their nominal price target. Until 2000, this nominal price target was
implicit. It was established to achieve domestic social needs, allow economic develop-
ment and prevent the expansion of other oil producers. Because the marginal cost of
production is lower for OPEC than for other producers, they possess a loose capacity
to gear prices downwards. Following the 1998 collapse in prices, OPEC decided to
bring more transparency to their decisions. At the beginning of 2000, they decided to
9announce a target price at the end of their meetings and they delineated a rule which
would play automatically on production quotas, although the latter has never been
put in place. Reference prices are based on a basket of seven types of crude oil that
member countries produce. This basket price was at the time expected to ﬂuctuate
between US$ 22 and 28 per barrel.
The world price of a barrel of Brent remained at around US$ 18 until March
2000, shifting then to US$ 25. To reﬂect OPEC’s acknowledgement of their loss of
marketing power, we set the nominal target to the actual price from the third quarter
of 2004 onwards (we use the OPEC bulletin as a reference). The real counterpart of
the nominal target (using the same deﬂator as previously), is denoted by P ∗
t .
3.4 Graphic analysis
We present, on ﬁgure 1, quarterly observations of the natural logarithm of the vari-
ables described above over 1989(1)–2005(4), consisting of 68 observations2. As noted
by Geroski, Ulph and Ulph (1987) we need take account of the changes in pricing
conduct. We therefore decided to restrict our analysis to the post-1987 era since the
market experienced major changes at that period; in particular, market forces began
to gain signiﬁcance.
Four variables are clearly trending: stocks and demands, with seasonal patterns
exhibited by demands—although non OECD is less regular—and less obviously by
OECD stocks. Non OECD stocks are much smoother. This reﬂects the variable’s
2All computations were carried out using PcGive and PcGets (see Hendry & Doornik, 2001, and
Hendry & Krolzig, 2001). Tails probabilities and p-values for the χ2 distributions were obtained
using GiveWin (see Doornik & Hendry, 2001).
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Figure 1: Plots of the variables entering the analysis.
larger growth: exp(.75) corresponds to an increase of about 100% compared to 20 to
30% for the other three variables.
Quotas and prices also exhibit increasing patterns over the sample, especially since
2002 for the latter. We also present usdt, a variable representing the exchange rate
of the US dollar with respect to a basket of currencies (using the weights from the
IMF’s Special Drawing Rights), as we will use this variable to expand our models.
usdt looks more mean reverting than the others, but it shows long departures from
its overall sample mean between 1995 and 2005.
114 Cointegration analysis
4.1 A VAR representation
Since we chose to restrict our attention to a sample consisting of 68 observations,
we are constrained in our analysis and cannot resort to general unrestricted VAR
modeling. Yet this does not prevent analysis on sub-versions of our model. First, we
analyze the variables presented previously by means of a VAR(1) where we include
an unrestricted constant. A graphic analysis of the ﬁt is presented on ﬁgures 2
and 3 where we discarded the use of non OECD stocks as this variable does not
seem to improve the estimation but lowers the precision (via increased variance of
the estimators). Although it enters the VAR, we do not present here the results
for p∗
t to make the ﬁgures more readable. Despite a few large outliers, the ﬁt is
reasonable—although the lack of seasonal patterns for the ﬁtted OECD demand would
require additional fourth-order lags as regressors—and we conclude that the variables
presented here constitute a reasonably congruent (see Hendry, 1997) representation of
the data generating process. In the analyses below, we will include indicator variables
to account for the beginning of the ﬁrst Iraq war (I90q3 and I90q4) and the beginning
of the second Iraq war (I03q2). When performing a battery of speciﬁcation tests for
the VAR(1) representation, we notice that the data exhibit residual autocorrelation.
Adding fourth-order lags of the endogenous variables correct for this, but for reasons
of parsimony, we cannot carry out our cointegration analysis on a VAR(4). We will
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Figure 3: Fit of a VAR(1) model on the ﬁve variables
(p,p∗,q,sOECD,dOECD,dnon OECD ).
14We are now ready to perform cointegration tests and we use Johansen’s trace test
(see Johansen, 1991 and 1996) which leads to rejecting the presence of fewer than
one stationary relation (at a p-value lower than 1%) and to accepting the existence
of two cointegrating vectors.
Cointegration test over the sample 1989(2)-2005(4)
rank log-likelihood eigenvalues Trace Statistic Prob.
0 828.0655 – 180.84 [0.000] **
1 859.9639 0.61411 117.04 [0.001] **
2 886.8835 0.55227 63.204 [0.150]
3 900.8864 0.34164 35.198 [0.442]
4 910.1124 0.24073 16.746 [0.666]
5 916.2178 0.16661 4.5354 [0.852]
6 918.2215 0.058059 0.52792 [0.467]
We also test the same model when allowing also for a linear trend to enter the
cointegrating space. This leads to the same conclusion of a cointegration rank of 2.
Restrictions of the coeﬃcients of the cointegrating vectors allow for an identiﬁcation
of the stationary relations:
c1,t = pt − p
∗





t + 0.00172t (2)
these vectors are presented—demeaned with superscript µ—on ﬁgure 4. Their inter-
pretation is that (c1) OPEC attempts to control the diﬀerence between the observed
price and its target by modifying its quota; (c2) there is a link between OECD stocks
and demand, which corresponds loosely to a coverage rate—we will deﬁne this more











Figure 4: Cointegrating vectors corrected for the mean. c
µ
1 links OPEC quotas to the
diﬀerence between price and target. c
µ
2 relates OECD stocks and demand, and the
continous decrease in their ratio.
properly later—and their diﬀerence (in logs) has been decreasing at a constant rate
over the last ﬁfteen years, hence the necessity to add a linear trend for stationarity.
Relations between the variables entering the cointegrating relations are presented on
ﬁgure 5.
4.2 Weak exogeneity
Given the low number of observations at our disposal, we would like to pursue a
univariate analysis of the determinants of the real price of crude oil. For this to be
possible, we need to ascertain that we are entitled to model the distribution of the
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Figure 5: Relations between the variables constituting the cointegrating vectors.
17variable of interest without having to consider the marginal distribution of the condi-
tioning variables. This can be done provided that the regressors are weakly exogenous
for the parameters of the conditional regression, see Engle et al. (1983). In addition
to parameters being variation free (which is clear here), we need to assess that the
loading factors—or impact coeﬃcients, see Johansen (1996)—of the cointegrating vec-
tor c1 be zero for all the equations of the VAR, but that governing pt (and necessarily
p∗
t given its deﬁnition from 2004 on). We proceed to a Likelihood ratio test for these
restrictions. The log-likelihood of the unrestricted model is lUR = 867.048; imposing 5
impact factors to be zero leads to lR = 865.668. The statistic is then 2(lUR−lR) = 2.76
which we need comparing to the critical values of a χ2 [5] : this leads to a p-value of
74%. The same test, but not restricting the loading factor of qt leads to a p-value of
60%. It seems diﬃcult to consider that OPEC quotas are weakly exogenous for the
setting of prices, but we yet consider that we can marginally disregard the process
governing the behavior of OPEC. This therefore allows for a univariate analysis of
price determination, which we will do in the next section.
5 A univariate analysis
5.1 An equilibrium correction model
Under weak exogeneity of the regressors for the parameters of the conditional regres-
sion, we proceed to univariate modelling of the change in oil price. With the help of
the variables presented above. We also create an “expected demand coverage rate”
variable in order to assess whether the current level of stocks is suﬃcient to satisfy
18expected demand for the next period given the highly seasonal pattern of the lat-
ter. This variable is constructed as the ratio of current crude oil stocks in the OECD
countries over expected OECD demand for the next quarter, computed as the current
value to which we add the previous year’s corresponding quarter-to-quarter variation.
This is thus deﬁned as dT+1|T =ET [dT+1] following the linear rule:
ET [dT+1] = dT + L
4∆dT+1 = dT + ∆dT−3, (3)






where St is the current level of OECD stocks. This new variable closely mimics c
µ
2,t
but with a forward looking element.
The resulting model for the physical determination of crude oil prices is as follows
(standard errors in brackets):




































RSS = 0.3462, ˆ σ = 0.0816, R2 = 0.742, ¯ R2 = 0.693,
lnL = 163.920, AIC = −4.855, HQ = −4.707, SC = −4.480,








Thus this model satisﬁes almost all the speciﬁcation tests, has a ¯ R2 of about 70%,
and we can deem it congruent. Figures 6 and 7 present visual representations of the
ﬁt and of the distribution of the residuals.
Now the model (5) shows that the serial autocorrelation exhibited in the VAR(1)
can be corrected by the fourth order diﬀerence of the cointegrating vector c2,t. It
could have also been a simple consequence of the many outliers. We, hence, added
an indicator variable for the post-September 11, 2001 trauma. According to our
equation, the price is a decreasing function of current levels of OECD stocks via crt.
Changes in inventories also play a role, either as non OECD or via annual changes in
c2,t−1. Increasing non OECD demand also drives prices up but in a non-linear fashion
(with diminishing impact as the acceleration becomes larger). OPEC also achieves
its aims via an equilibrium correction feature involving c1,t−1.
The model presented above in (5) constitutes a valid representation of the deter-
mination for the price of crude oil according to the physical market. This accounts
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Figure 6: Univariate modeling of the changes in oil prices via an equilibrium correction
mechanism. Graphs above present the actual and ﬁtted values, and the graphs below












Spectral density Dpt 





Density Dpt  N(s=11) 






QQ plot Dpt ´ normal 
Figure 7: Analysis of residual distribution from ﬁtting an eqcm to the change in oil
prices. The ﬁgure presents estimates of the ACF and PACF (panel (a)), spectral den-
sity (b), density (c) and QQ-plot against the Normal. The four panels are consistent
with the residual being Normal white noise.
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Figure 8: Implications of the eqcm for the level of oil prices, and corresponding
forecast errors (panel (c)).
for about 70% of price variation, leaving the remaining 30% to ﬁnancial markets and
unexpected innovations. Figure 8 presents the corresponding forecasts for the price
level.
5.2 Alternative speciﬁcations
To prevent overﬁtting our model given the low number of observations, we attempted
to determine which variable account for most of the ﬁt, via a smaller version thereof.
This is presented in (6) with a ﬁt of ¯ R2 = 63% but speciﬁcation tests lead to rejecting
the hypothesis of non-autocorrelated errors with a p-value of 0.7%. This not need be
a problem if we follow Hendry and Krolzig (2005) who hold that when performing
23multiple, say n, speciﬁcation tests at a nominal size η, the probability of rejecting at
lest one is 1-(1 − η)
n ≈ nη so that congruency tests should be carried at the 1% level
to avoid almost one-hundred percent chance of rejection and yet some rejection is
to be expected. This smaller model (6) which excludes non-linear patterns therefore
constitutes a satisfactory yet non-congruent representation.




















We have also tried non linear models whereby the model is of the general form
∆pt = vt−1
 







for some linear combination wt of the z regressors and with vt a measure of historic
volatility (scaled by its geometric mean so that the product of past vt is unity) but
this model does not lead to a better ﬁt.
Additionally, as our interest lies in observing how the price relates to its physical
demand, we tried to compare its value to that of its currency of denomination. For
this purpose, we construct an exchange rate for the United States dollar with respect
to a basket of currencies, namely the Euro, the Pound Sterling and the Japanese
Yen, where the weights are chosen to follow those of the respective currencies in the
valuation of the IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). But this variable seemed not
to matter either.
245.3 Contributions
Here we need to compute the contributions of the diﬀerent variables via (5). Figure
9 records contribution to changes in pt since 2000q1 owed to the various regressors.
Because we deal with an eqcm, we need to take full account of the dynamics: here
we use 2000q1 as a reference observation and compute the dynamic impact of the
regressors. We use the fact that the eqcm takes the form





for some linear combination wt of the z regressors which we disregard ﬁrst. Re-write
(7) as

















so that we deﬁne the impact on ∆pt as













for some τ. Cumulating the Cz (i), starting from some observation of reference T0,




C∆p (z,T0 + i)
which we compare to pt−pT0. For the impact of the cointegrating relation, we simply
report the cumulative sum of −α(pi − wi) for i = T0,...,t.
Figure 9 presents these results. Three distinct periods appear clearly:
251. 2000-2001: after a rise in 2000, the price of oil were driven downwards, in the
next year, by market forces. Following the collapse of oil price in 1997-98, a very
sharp cut in OPEC production quotas from July 1998 to April 1999 was aimed
to dry the market out and gear prices to the cartel’s target band. The nominal
Brent price jumped back to US$ 26.8 at the beginning of 2000 (our reference
point)—having fallen to US$ 11 at the end of 1998—and shot up to $ 30.4
in the third quarter of that year. In this context, OPEC began to soften its
policy in 2000. Oil production was allowed to increase quickly. OECD inventories
nevertheless remained at low levels. Not until 2001 did supply tensions (with
respect to demand) progressively disappear. But a slowdown in demand in 2001
alleviated the pressure on prices, leading OPEC to react and cut dramatically
its production quotas. The coverage rate of stocks recovered rapidly in 2001,
thus explaining the negative contribution to the change in oil price attributed
to OECD supply and demand in 2000 and, particularly, in 2001. Prices declined
sharply to $ 19.3 at the end of 2001 in the September, 11 aftermath. This is
captured in our equation by an indicator variable whose eﬀect does not need
presenting in ﬁgure 9.
2. 2002-2003: increasing non OECD demand and low non OECD stocks, combined
with a lowering OECD cr led to an increase in oil prices. At this stage, OPEC
stayed ﬁrm and maintained quotas at a very low level to prevent excess supply in
2002. Then, in the ﬁrst half of 2003, OPEC became much more accommodative.
During the period preceding intervention of the US troops in Iraq—starting
on March, 20—and throughout the active war, price volatility was high. This
26explains the presence of the indicator variable in the 2003q2. Indeed, with the
combination of a break in Iraqi oil production and of a stronger world demand,
markets feared a shortage. To reassure consumers and soften prices, OPEC
largely loosened its quotas, and Saudi Arabia committed to satisfy demand.
Yet, prices ended up stabilizing at a relatively high level.
3. 2004-2005: a strong disconnection emerged, prices exploding while all contri-
butions would have driven them in the opposite direction. The situation on
the physical market was improving. Despite a demand shock in 2004, supply
stayed above demand. Producers hence managed to accumulate inventories
and increase their coverage of expected future consumption. In 2005, a demand
slowdown met rising production quotas, the latter even reached all time highs.
Yet, despite vanishing physical tensions and an accommodative OPEC policy,
markets did not calm and the price did not decrease.
5.4 Market premium
The analysis above enables us to derive the premium on oil prices with respect to
physical markets determination. This is done using the diﬀerence between the current
price and the cumulated residuals from estimation starting with a reference observa-
tion, here 2000q1. It leads to the graph presented on ﬁgure 10 where we notice that
the premium has been exploding since 2004. Notice as presented on ﬁgure 8 that the
premium we derive is diﬀerent from the residuals from the computed level of prices.
Here, the idea is to construct a dynamic forecast analysis with respect to the physical
elements of the market. We see that most of the price increase observed in 2004 and
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Figure 9: Cumulated dynamic contributions of the eqcm regressors to the changes in
the log of real oil prices. All series are presented as the variation since 2000q1. S&D
represents the combined eﬀect of supply and demand.
282005 can be attributed to non market forces. The premium, thus computed, increased
by up to US$ 20 between the ends of 2001 and 2005.
Several factors can explain this. The demand shock in 2004 highlights the inad-
equacy of the supply structure both on the upstream market and the downstream
market. Over several years, investment was weak. Shortages of some speciﬁc prod-
ucts appeared in 2004. Spare capacities had never been so tight. Moreover, despite
the slowdown in non OECD demand, combined worldwide demand growth was above
its recent trend. At the same time, several disruptions were aﬀecting supply from
non OPEC countries. Although markets were largely supplied, concerns were rising
about the diﬃculties faced by suppliers in coping with such a dynamic demand. The
geopolitical context fed these fears. Besides a worsening Iraqi situation, there were
spreading tensions in the Middle East, conﬂicts in Nigeria, political instability in
Ecuador, Venezuela and Russia. Expectations concerning the risk of a global short-
age rose, leading to a rise in prices, increased speculation and high volatility. In this
context, the debate on the depletion of world oil reserves emerged. According to some
pessimistic studies, the world approaches the all time maximum of oil production,
from which prices increase very quickly.
Neither the improvements in the situation of the physical market or an easing
OPEC policy could calm markets. Volatility was extreme in 2004 and 2005, fostered
by a high level of ﬁnancial liquidity and speculative activity. As a consequence, the
cumulated sum of residuals increased away from zero: this constituted a premium on














Figure 10: Dynamic forecast of the nominal crude oil price and associated market
premium
306 Conclusions
In this article, we derived an econometric model for the determination of the real price
of a barrel of crude oil. This model is based entirely on physical aspects of the market
situation. Two cointegrating relations matter here, relating to OPEC’s attempts
at controlling prices and a tendency—also witnessed in other industries—towards
a reduction in inventories. Using a dynamic forecast derived from the equilibrium
correction mechanism, we were able to compute a resulting premium on the non-
physical elements; we call it a market premium since it embodies elements which are
not part of historic physical market behavior. This premium accounts for about half
the increase in oil price between 2000 and the end of 2005.
Our model also allows for a decomposition of the various contributions of the
regressors to the change in prices. We can thus observe what factors are driving
the evolutions at any point in time. We observed that between 2004 and 2005, the
increase in market price was indeed unrelated to the physical situation, whereas in
the two years before, the increase was caused by emerging market (i.e. non OECD)
demand and a tightening of OPEC quotas.
In this paper, we restricted our analysis to the post-1988 era, when oil prices
started being driven by market forces and we did not include aspects which markets
only started to focus on, such as spare production capacity and “the end of oil”.
As with any econometric modeling, we need a sample that is large enough for any
pattern to be estimated. But these issues will have to be estimated when enough
data is available.
Finally, is it possible to combine both physical and ﬁnancial aspects? Unfortu-
31nately, periodicity is an issue. Here, our model is quarterly and we could not have
increased the frequency. Most models based on ﬁnancial aspects focus on higher fre-
quencies, and it is not sure whether the inﬂuences still matter from a quarter to the
other.
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